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Introduction 
 
Insider trading is considered to be an illicit activity in many countries from New 
Zealand to the United States. In order to constrain and control it they spend serious 
amount of money to maintain the liable agencies and market monitoring systems. The 
foreign economists generally write long analysis about the negative effects of this 
crime on economy and about the importance of market integrity, protection of 
investors and equality. There are several cases abroad when the court called to 
account for insider trading and employed serious sanctions. In Hungary, there are also 
some companies, who had suspicious activity, hence had criminal proceedings against 
them. The most notable and recent one is the Questor case. Both in Hungary and 
abroad, it is regarded as a frequently committed conduct. Since 1990, when the 
insider trading related provisions has become the part of the Hungarian Criminal 
Code, there were merely a few investigation after this crime and three cases entered 
the court phase, but only two ended with condemnation. Virtually, there are no calling 
to account practice in relation to insider trading in the last quarter century in 
Hungary.
2
      
The undermentioned case shows a good example for this.
3
 
The Chief Prosecutor’s Office established the following facts in its indictment4: the 
defendant in the second degree, who was the general manager of the N. Rt., entered 
with the stocks of the Rt. into the operator trade market of the Foreign Stock 
Exchange. He was engaged in negotiations with a local brokerage firm about the 
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introduction, which was expected to cause price increase for the stocks, but he made a 
submission about this matter for the board of directors only two months later, which 
was approved with a decree that day. Before nine days to the submission, the 
defendants in the first and second degree entrusted the L. B. Rt. and G. Rt. to buy 
15000 amount of stocks between 900 Ft to 1800 Ft limit prices for N. Rt., which was 
based on pre-calculation and their aim was to achieve gain in rates. Prior to the 
assignments, there were only a few business transactions for the stocks of the N. Rt. 
in the market of the Budapest Stock Exchange.  
As a result of the security purchase by the defendant in the first degree, based on the 
insider information provided by the defendant in the second degree, the stocks’ price 
of the N. Rt. increased – from 600 Ft to 2400 Ft - from the begin of the purchase till 
the publication of the State Security Supervision’s licence about placing them into the 
market of the Foreign Stock Exchange. After six days of the purchase, they sold 7370 
amount of stocks with 3600 Ft/piece price via the joint venture of the defendants 
called P. Kft. and P. Ltd. – which company was registered in Maldives – for the E. M. 
N. Értékpapírkereskedelmi Kft. They divided the achieved profit based on the pre-
calculation of the defendant in the first degree. The defendant in the first degree sold 
7080 amount of stocks – which was bought via the L.B. Rt. – on behalf of his wife 
and mother. On the grounds of his acts, the Chief Prosecutor’s Office accused the 
defendant in the first degree as perpetrator, the defendant in the second degree as 
accomplice of breach of bank secret under 300/A § of the Hungarian Criminal Code. 
The established facts in the sentence of the Court of First Instance
5
 was almost the 
same as the indictment but it contained also plus information. For example in the 
beginning of the 1990s, N. Rt.’s resources ran out, had an increasing credit volume 
along with contraction of the markets.  The company tried to launch a consolidation 
programme in order to ameliorate its position. At the end of 1993, the firm got rid of 
the bank loans, the associate companies gained improvement in the field of efficiency, 
however the market did not respond to the positive changes occurred in the N. Rt.’s 
economic position, the company ensured the publication of its balances and economic 
data in vain.  Owing to the defendants’ conducts, 17 million Ft price profit was 
generated and the N. Rt. was able to perform share capital increase. Due to this, the 
company managed to cease its 300 million Ft debt against B. Bank, because the bank 
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was willing to subscribe the stocks in exchange of the debt.  The defendants lived in a 
semi-detached house and they established the companies jointly, which were involved 
in the purchase of the stocks. They denied committing the crime, the defendant in the 
first degree claimed that he did not buy the stocks based on insider information.  He 
saw that the defendant in the second degree helped the company out from its bad 
position, collected the debts, therefore, he was sure about that the price of the stocks 
would rise and he started to purchase the stocks without any information from the 
defendant in the second degree. The another defendant also denied providing insider 
information to the primary defendant and alleged that he did not get a share from the 
profit. Though he admitted that the found notes were written by him, but it was only 
subsequent account and not a pre-calculation for the business of the defendant in the 
first degree. The court did not accept the defence of the defendants. According to the 
argument, the timing of the purchase and the introduction of the N. Rt.’s stocks into 
the Foreign Stock Exchange market was not a coincidence. It was also not accidental 
when the defendant in the first degree – who used once his first forename then his 
another one during the transactions - entrusted more companies, which are associated 
with N. Rt., to purchase, notwithstanding the  witnesses warned him about the 
consequence which would be an artificially created price increase. The court accepted 
the opinion pf M. Péter who stated five weeks before the introduction the pace of the 
price increase started to be significantly faster than the typical rise of entire period 
and it would have not happened due to simple “fundamental information”.  
The argument of the court included the definition, brief history and function of the 
Stock Exchange after the personal data of the defendants, which presents that the 
operation of the stock exchange was in an early stage yet. The court also took into 
account as an aggravating circumstance the fact that „the Budapest Stock Exchange 
had a relatively underdeveloped condition.”  
The Court of First Instance sentenced the defendant in the first degree as perpetrator 
to 10 months imprisonment in prison and 100.000 Ft fine as an ancillary punishment, 
the court decided on the suspension of the imprisonment sentence on probation for 2 
years. The court found more grievous the conducts of the defendant in the second 
degree thus he was sentenced as abettor to 1 year and 2 months imprisonment in 
prison and 200.000 Ft fine as an ancillary punishment, the court decided on the 
suspension of the imprisonment sentence on probation for 2 years. The court 
established that the defendant in the second degree had determinative influence on the 
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defendant in the first degree and this establishment was different than, the content of 
the indictment. 
The Chief Prosecutor’s Office filed an appeal against both defendants because of the 
incorrect application of the substantive criminal provisions. The prosecution also 
wanted aggravation since the danger to the society of the crime added to the charges 
means that it leads to the loss of trust towards the operation of the stock exchange, 
which involves damaging consequences for the entire economy and the passed 
sentence in such case would be a precedent. The prosecution found necessary to set an 
example and everybody should see whether it is worth to commit or not. The 
attorneys of the defendants filed an appeal for acquittal and in case of the defendant in 
the first degree they motioned to overturn judgment of the first instance, because 
according to his attorney the court fulfilled its argument obligations only partly and 
this misdemeanour proceedings affected significantly the sentence. 
The Court of Second Instance found valid the established statement of facts by the 
Court of First Instance in its sentence, the defendant in the second degree was 
responsible as accomplice, since it could not be proved that he has a determinative 
effect on the defendant in the first degree.
6
 The court completed the statement of facts 
with the following: the defendant in the first degree obtained the expended amount of 
money on purchase from loans, which he asked from family members and creditors. 
The creditors were aware of that what the defendant asked the money for, they did not 
set a deadline for the pay back and entered the stock exchange market along with him. 
The court stated that the defendant in the first degree would not take out loans if he 
did not have insider information. The notes of the defendant in the second degree 
could not be subsequent account since it did not contain exactly the number of the 
stocks. At the same time, the court found unreasonable the duration of the sentenced 
imprisonment, so it was reduced to 6 months with the same probation time. The 
extent of the fine was increased based on the committed value, the earnings and 
financial circumstances of the defendants, since the court found the first sentence 
mild. 
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The background of the regulation 
 
The current Hungarian regulation on insider trading can be found under Section 410 
of the Act C of 2012 on the new Hungarian Criminal Code. 
Section 410.  
Any person who:  
a) uses insider information to conclude a transaction involving financial instruments;  
b) entrusts another person to conclude a transaction on the basis of insider 
information in his possession for the financial instruments to which the information 
pertains; or  
c) discloses insider information to any unauthorized person for financial gain or 
advantage;  
is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three years. 
 
In Hungary, this crime was unknown before 1990, but we are not at all late. In the 
United States there has been legal regulation related to insider trading since 1934, and 
since 1981 in the United Kingdom. In Germany (where the stock market bears old 
traditions) the regulation came into force only in 1994. The European Union declared 
its principles including the ban of insider trading in 1989.
7
  
The statement of facts of insider trading got its current form in 2005. It became 
shorter than the former ones (for example the ‚forbidden security-trading‘ and the 
‚insider security-trading‘), but it also widened the range of objects on which this 
crime can be committed (not only on securities but also on ‚other financial means‘), 
and at last it does not contain the definition of insider information anymore, since that 
is included in one of the background norms.  
The Act on Capital Market of 2001 (Tpt.) provides the background regulation for this 
crime. This statute provides a vigorous competence for the State Supervision of 
Financial Organisations, where today a separated department deals with the cases of 
insider trading (Market Controlling Department). The National Bank of Hungary is 
authorised to charge the perpetrator of insider trading and market influencing with a 
penalty, if he/she violates, eludes, omits or performs late one of the provisions written 
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in the Tpt. or in other law derived from it, or one of the National Bank of Hungary’s 
orders or its own by-law.
8
 
The penalty in the case of insider trading or market influencing can be between 
100.000 and 100.000.000 Forints (400 and 400.000 Euros) or maximum the 400% of 
the traceable financial benefit. This could have a strong dissuasive force in several 
cases. The announcement making obligation is also a new element in the regulation in 
the case of suspicion of insider trading (and this must be fulfilled by the investment 
service providers), but there is no criminal sanction attached to the omission of this 
obligation, so it is not a crime, but it also can result a penalty. The service providers 
are obliged to name an assigned person, just like in the case of money laundering, but 
here the announcement has to be sent to the National Bank of Hungary. The National 
Bank of Hungary decides whether it submits an accusation to the police or settles for 
a penalty in its own competence. 
The object of the crime is the equality of chances, which is essential for stock market 
transactions and indirectly to fair market attitude.  
The offender’s behaviour is the sealing of a transaction, the crime can be committed 
outside the stock market. The phrase “sealing a transaction” does not mean that only 
the perpetrator himself must seal the transaction, in fact it is not the typical case; 
usually they use the assistance of some kind of a broker or commission merchant. The 
investment service provider – if he is unaware of the insider character of the 
transaction – is exempted from criminal liability on behalf of his mistake. (If only 
under ordinary care he should have recognised the insider transaction, the State 
Supervision of Financial Organs may fine him.) In the first two phrases neither the 
result (gaining benefit), nor the aim of gaining benefit are elements of the statement of 
facts, so the crime is carried out even if the perpetrator suffers losses from the 
transaction. The handing over of insider information to gain benefit practically means 
the selling of such information. 
(There are disputes in the scientific literature, whether the benefit can only be a 
financial type or for example a moral acknowledgment (e.g. promotion) or the 
possibility of a sexual relationship. We are willing to accept this concept, but adding, 
that in practice it is not the usual behaviour of a perpetrator.)  
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The method of perpetration in the first phrase is “with the use of insider information”, 
in the second is “according to the insider information in his possession”. To interpret 
this, we need to specify the definition of insider information, which we can find in the 
Act on Capital Market. 
Insider information: 
1. such important information9 concerning a financial instrument (not 
including the goods-based derived transaction) 
 that is not yet publicised 
 that is directly or indirectly connected to the financial instrument or to the 
issuer of the financial instrument  
 that in the case of publication would be capable of significantly influence 
the price of the financial instrument
10
 
2. such important information in the case of persons, who are assigned to 
execute any assignment concerning the financial instrument -excluding the ones listed 
in a. - that is connected to the current assignment given by the client- 
3. such an important information concerning a goods-based derived 
transaction, which 
 was not yet publicised 
 is directly or indirectly connected to a goods-based derived transaction 
 according to the accepted market practice should be shared with the market 
actors 
 information is regularly shared with the market actors 
 
The perpetrator can be anyone, so anyone can commit insider trade, who possesses 
insider information. The circle of so-called insider persons, who posses insider 
information, can be found in the background norm. 
Insider person: 
1. leading official and member of the supervising committee of the issuer 
2. manager, leading official and member of the supervising committee of the 
legal person or economical partnership without a legal personality in that the 
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issuer owns directly or indirectly twenty-five or more percent of the shares, or 
has a right to vote 
3. leading official, member of the supervising committee and manager of a legal 
person or economic partnership without legal personality that directly or 
indirectly owns ten or more percent in the issuer or has a right to vote 
4. manager, leading official and member of the supervising committee of any 
organisation participating in the distribution or in organising the public buying 
offer according to the VII. Article; furthermore any employee of these organs 
or the issuer, who participated in the distribution or in the issue, who got 
insider information during his work within a year from the distribution 
5. a natural person who directly or indirectly owns ten or more percent of the 
issuer’s capital 
6. manager, leading official and member of the supervising committee of the 
issuer’s accounting credit institute 
7. who received insider information because of his work or duties, during his 
work or exercising his regular assignments, or in any other way  
8. who received insider information through crime 
9. a person living in a common household or closely related to a person listed in 
points a.-h. 
10. a person acting on behalf of such a company, where a an insider person listed 
in points a.-i. owns a significant share  
This crime can only be committed intentionally, in the first two phrase with dolus 
eventualis, in the third – according to the aim- only with dolus directus.     
It makes more difficult the judicature, when some important theoretical questions, 
which are important in the practice aren’t specified perfectly. Because of this for 
example there are just few criminal processes in insider transaction. 
The first question is the definition of the benefit. There are two absolutely opposite 
opinions in the definition of benefit. One of the opinions says that the desired benefits 
can be a service like sexual contact, moreover a moral admission, like an 
improvement, not just a pecuniary thing.
11
 
The justification of the minister proves this opinion. The justification says that it is 
not important, that the transmitter or the beneficiary got the benefit, or the benefit is a 
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pecuniary thing or it is a kind of personal benefit. The justification of the minister is a 
type of the jurisprudential interpretation, so it is not binding in Hungary. It is a kind of 
help for the judicature, so it has a big effect for the judicature, all the same that is not 
binding. 
 It is confirmed by the justification of the minister in which the legislative intention is 
explained.
12
 Even so, it confounds the law in practice, because it has an opposite 
aspect. The judicature aspect is that the benefit can be only a pecuniary thing, because 
the perpetrator intention aims for a big profit-taking, or to avoid a price loss. They 
support this aspect of the construction of the crime, because they say if the insider’s 
breach of duty is intent for other benefits, it is effect a kind of corruption crime. 
The other important question is the count of the crime, there are also opposite 
opinions in this topic. One group states that the count of the crime is defined by the 
numbers of economic organizations that is concerned by the insider information until 
they join a company as a stake or shareholder. This statement means that use more 
insider information, or do more transactions it is a natural unit. To reckon with the 
disposable time for the perpetrator we can exclude cumulatively. The opposite 
opinion states that the count of the crime is determined by the number of the 
information, not by the number of the transactions, do continually transactions with 
the same insider information it effects cumulatively. 
13
 Naturally, we cannot define 
exactly what is that time that is already, or yet enough for determining cumulatively, 
and this can be diverse in different crimes.
14
 The insider transaction is that kind of 
crime, in which the resulation of the big profit-taking can inspire the perpetrator very 
much, to use one insider information in a short time to do many transactions with one 
determination, for the harm of similar investors. For the judicature it is a problem to 
determine insider information definition, all the same that the Tpt. determine it 
exactly. The problem is that the definition contains two not real exact expressions. 
One is the assumption of ’’not publicized information’’. The insider is workaround 
this in the following way: the insider brings out the important information in a 
website, which is not frequently visited by the investors and they usually don’t get the 
information from this website. In this situation, we cannot impeach the insider 
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because he/she published the information and it is accessible for everybody, although 
he/she knows that not too much investor will get that information.  
Ideally, the insider’s intention cannot intent to select the investors who are get the 
information
15
, but it is very hard to prove that what was the intention of the insider.  
The definition of price sensitive information is also a problem, it is not sure that in a 
moment an information what effects in the market. 
16
 The price sensitivity of the 
information depends of the activity of the company, and of the function of the 
company.
17
 
There is a more significant problem than the above mentioned: the lots of insider 
information, because from these carefulness, not well prepared, trifling, bad 
habitudes, the belief into the sufficient financial materials, or because in default of 
ideas in criminal law the information do not get into the criminal investigation 
authorities.  
The other relative problem is to analyse, and to prove of the intention of the accused. 
Was the kitchen cooking employee be aware that he/she get an insider information 
when he/she questioned the headmaster of the company? There are some simple case 
when it is easy to decide this, but in most of the cases it is hard task. Because of this, 
maybe it will be practical to penalize incautious form of the insider transaction, like 
the Tpt. says in the 201. § (1) section. 
The instruments of the National Bank of Hungary in now days are able to recon 
effective, and to sanctioning the insider transaction in Hungary, in the last years it 
was sensible that the cases in insider transaction were multiply. In now days the work 
of the stock market has traditions. In the form as the insider transaction is in the 
Hungarian Criminal Code is inopportune to impeach, it is necessary to clear the 
question of the count of the insider transaction, the benefit snatching, and to solve the 
problem of the difficulty of prove. It is meritorious to make all these if we are believe 
seriously that the insider transaction can effect big harms in the economic life in a 
state.    
In 2016, new EU rules to fight against insider dealing and market manipulation in 
Europe’s financial markets took effect in order to ensure a more efficient and 
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transparent EU financial market and increase investor protection as well as 
confidence. The Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on criminal sanctions for market abuse set minimum rules for the Member States and 
oblige them to adopt or maintain more stringent criminal law rules for market abuse. 
Hungary accepted a law (the Act CIII of 2016) to meet the directive’s judicial 
harmonization requirements. Thus, they added two new offences for the Hungarian 
Criminal Code and came into force on 28
th
 of October in 2016: under Section 410/A 
unlawful disclosure of inside information and under Section 411 unlawful market 
manipulation. The former c) point of insider trading has become a separate crime as 
unlawful disclosure of inside information and it is punishable only as a misdemeanour 
from now on.
18
 
Section 410/A  
Any person who discloses inside information to an unauthorized person or persons in 
order to gain unlawful advantage or to cause unlawful disadvantage is guilty of a 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment not exceeding two years. 
Section 411 
Any person who: 
a) enters into a transaction, places an order to trade or cancels or amends such 
order, makes, cancels or amends a recommendation in own account trading, which 
gives false or misleading signals as to the supply of, demand for, or price of, a 
financial instrument or a related spot commodity contract, secures the price thereof at 
an abnormal or artificial level; 
 b) employs a fictitious device or any other form of deception relating to a transaction 
in financial instrument, which affects the price of one or several financial instruments 
or a related spot commodity contract;  
c) transmits or disseminates false or misleading information or provides false or 
misleading inputs or involved in any other behaviour which manipulates the 
calculation of a benchmark; is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment not 
exceeding three years.  
(2) Any person who disseminates information to the public at large, with the purpose 
of financial gain, which gives false or misleading signals as to the supply of, demand 
for, or price of a financial instrument, or a related spot commodity contract, or 
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secures the price thereof at an abnormal or artificial level, shall be punishable in 
accordance with Subsection (1). 
 (3) Any person who induces other persons to make a new capital investment or to 
increase an existing one, or to sell or reduce a capital investment by disclosing or 
broadcasting false information concerning the financial position of an economic 
operator or the executive officer of such economic operator in connection with his 
office, or concerning financial instruments in relation to the economic operator, or by 
concealing information shall be punishable in accordance with Subsection (1). 
 
 
The Questor case 
 
In the most cases, broker scandals are in connection with insider trading.  The most 
famous broker scandal case in Hungary is the Questor case, this is out of question. 
A Hungarian company accomplished a series of financial frauds which affected lots 
of clients and generated a huge amount of damage. It was led by Csaba Tarsoly and in 
the Quaestor group they built a pyramid scheme, while on paper the company had 
zero equity. They offered high, attractive profits comparing to the average market 
yields (offered around 3% interest premium). The group tried to cover the extensive 
operation of the company (real estate projects) from the savings of small investors. It 
got bankrupt in 2015. According to the Hungarian National Bank the bankruptcy of 
the Quaestor group happened because they sold more bonds than as much as they 
issued. They had 70 billion Forints worth bond programme while they issued 60 
billion Forints worth bonds and sold 210 billion Forints worth bonds (which is equal 
to the 1% of the Hungarian GDP), so Quaestor issued 150 billion Forints worth fictive 
bonds. In accordance with the bond issue prospectus Quaestor didn’t have to 
guarantee liquid secondary market for the securities, however, in order to maintain 
trust – and cover risks related to the bonds - they were subscribing price continuously 
and withdrew their bonds. In case of panic, when many clients wanted to get their 
money back, they should have suspended the repurchases, but they didn’t do it so they 
couldn’t fulfil the demands in the end.  The number of the injured parties may be over 
13 
 
30 thousand investors and among them can be found local governments and 
administrative agencies.
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